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1. INTRODUCTION
In this work we study the effectiveness of market-based (M-B) and command-
and-control (C&C) policies in triggering a transition toward sustainable growth,
thus preventing environmental catastrophes related to climate change.
One of the major contemporary challenges is to cope with environmental
degradation—and rising temperature caused by the increasing consumption of
fossil fuels above all—together with the search for appropriate policy responses.
The debate is still unsettled as some researchers call for major and immediate
actions [Stern (2007)], whereas others suggest limited and gradual policy inter-
ventions [see, e.g., Nordhaus (2007)]. Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu
et al. (2016) have recently contributed to the such debate proposing a two-sector
model of directed technical change, which allows studying how M-B environ-
mental policies can affect the development of “dirty” and “green” technologies,
thus impacting on climate change. When the clean and dirty inputs are “strong”
substitutes [more on that in Acemoglu et al. (2012), and in Section 4.3 of this
paper], an optimal M-B environmental policy grounded on a “carbon” tax and
a green research subsidy can redirect technical change toward the green sector,
preventing environmental catastrophes. However, given path dependence in the
direction of technical change [Aghion et al. (2016)], we find that the window of
opportunity of such policy actions is limited: if the technology gap between the
dirty and green inputs becomes sufficiently large, M-B interventions are ineffec-
tive and environmental disasters will occur with certainty. The policy window is
shorter when the two inputs are “weak” substitutes. Moreover, in the latter case
(as well as when inputs are complementary) M-B interventions cannot avoid an
environmental catastrophe unless they prevent the economy from growing.
In line with the model from Acemoglu et al., the majority of the literature
focuses its policy analysis on environmental directed technical change on M-B
monetary incentives (see also Section 2). Nevertheless, the adoption of regu-
lations not grounded on market incentives is quite common in environmental
policy and, in many cases, it proved effective. For instance, some international
agreements (e.g., the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer) fix an exogenous ceiling on specific polluting concentrations. Shapiro and
Walker (2015) found that the increasing stringency of US environmental regu-
lation accounted for three quarters of the 60% decrease in pollution emissions
(e.g., nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and volatile organic com-
pounds) from US manufacturing in the period from 1990 to 2008. In general, both
price and quantity forms of control can solve allocation problems and there is no
a priori criterion to favor one instrument over the other [Weitzman (1974)].
On these grounds, we explore how static M-B and C&C policies impact the
long-run trajectory of an economy characterized by path dependence in the his-
tory of innovations. More precisely, we account for C&C policies in a model of
endogenous growth and directed technical change, and we study their effects on
the long-run dynamics of both growth and environmental quality.1
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We find that a C&C policy that fixes the maximum amount of dirty inputs
for each unit of clean ones always redirects technical change toward green tech-
nologies avoids environmental catastrophes, independently of the timing of its
implementation. In particular, our main result shows that the strength of the C&C
policy needed to redirect technical shrinks decreases over time, while that of M-B
policies increases. In that, C&C policies are a valuable alternative to M-B ones to
reach a green transition whenever the window of opportunity for environmental
interventions is bounded. Moreover, even if the dirty and clean inputs are weak
substitutes or complementary, C&C interventions imposing a ceiling to the use of
polluting inputs avoid disasters without halting economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a literature review
in Section 2 and the model in Section 3. Alternative policies interventions are
compared in Section 4. Finally, we discuss the results in Section 5.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The optimal policy to induce a large-scale transition from dirty to clean produc-
tion system is—in the absence of any other market failure—a Pigouvian price on
the polluting substances, typically taking the form of a carbon tax on emissions
[Nordhaus (1991)]. Moreover, in a world with perfect knowledge and no uncer-
tainty, the standard duality argument implies the equivalence between the use of
prices and quantities as mitigation policy instruments. However, Weitzman (1974)
shows that in an imperfect world, the relative advantage of policies on prices
vis-à-vis quantities can vary according to the amount and type of inadequate infor-
mation. As a consequence, quantity-based mitigation policies can be preferred to
price-based ones under certain conditions. In this paper, we show that similar con-
clusions are implied by the interaction of policy choice and path dependence in
technical change, while assuming no uncertainty about the different technologies.
Many studies have compared the effects of M-B and C&C policies [see
(Hepburn, 2006), for an extensive comparison of environmental and climate poli-
cies]. Buchanan (1969); Li and Shi (2010), and Li and Sun (2015) emphasize
the drawbacks of marked-based instruments and support the use of regulation.2
The same conclusion is suggested by recent empirical evidences [see, e.g., Lee
et al. (2011) and Shapiro and Walker (2015)]. On the contrary, Rozenberg et al.
(2014) show that when underinvestment in polluting capital is possible, carbon
pricing is superior to C&C interventions. Recently, van der Meijden and Smulders
(2018) find that the two sides of M-B policies might conflict: while R&D subsi-
dies speed up the transition, fossil fuel taxes postpone the switch to renewable
energies. More generally, there is no crystal-clear agreement about the identifica-
tion of the “best” climate policy and the way to compare different instruments.
For example, Goulder and Parry (2008) consider a wide range of possible inter-
ventions, and they analyze the extent to which they meet a variety of major
evaluation criteria, including cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, the ability
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to address uncertainties, and political feasibility. They find that no single instru-
ment is clearly superior and that ensembles of different climate policies can be
more effective.
Furthermore, Acemoglu et al. (2012) study how directed technical change can
support the transition to a “green” economy and prevent environmental disasters.3
They find that the joint adoption of carbon taxes and research subsidies can direct
innovation toward clean technologies [on the complementarity of tax and subsi-
dies see also Grimaud et al. (2011)]. These works have inspired a good deal of
recent contributions on environmental policy impact in presence of directed tech-
nical change. For instance, Mattauch et al. (2015) add learning by doing effects
and explore the role of substitution effects between clean and dirty inputs, show-
ing that the policy proposed in Acemoglu et al. (2012) might be excessively
limited in scope; Durmaz and Schroyen (2016) include the effects of an abate-
ment (carbon capture and storage) technology; Greaker et al. (2018) introduce
decreasing returns to R&D and allow future carbon taxes influencing current
R&D decisions. Even more recently, Kruse-Andersen (2017) develops a vari-
ant of the model accounting for population growth effects, while Bezin (2017)
enriches it to study the effects of cultural transmission mechanisms. Finally,
van den Bijgaart (2017) extends the framework to a two-country setting [see also
Hemous (2012) for an alternative North–South model extension]. Such stream
of studies showed the usufulness of models of directed technical change in the
analysis of environmental policy.
However, the fundamental role of innovation for the effectiveness of climate
and environmental policy has a long history and it has extensively been explored
both at theoretical [Goulder and Schneider (1999); Gillingham et al. (2008),
and Otto and Reilly (2008)] and empirical levels [(Popp, 2002) and Jaffe et al.
(2003)].4 These contributions pointed out that the rewards from the development
of new technologies do come not from current or future pollution reductions, but
from the expected profits associated with technological improvements. Expected
profitability has been shown depending, in turn, on the size of the economy
[Sue Wing (2003)], on the scarcity of fossil fuels (Gans, 2012), and on the past
history of innovations [Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Aghion et al. (2016)].
In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2016) show that if the initial technological gap
between dirty and clean technologies is too wide, the potential transition to clean
technology cannot occur as clean research must climb several steps to catch
up with dirty technology and the gap discourages research efforts in “green”
technology. As a consequence, the effects of path dependence (i.e., the history
of innovations) should be considered in assessing the effectiveness of different
climate policy instruments to induce “green” transitions, as well as to prevent
environmental disasters related to excessive greenhouse gas emissions.
The above literature on and environmental policy directed technical change
often concentrates on the determination of the optimal mix of carbon taxes and
R&D subsidies. However, it does not offer a systematic comparison of price-based
and quantity-based policies. This is exactly the starting point of the present paper.
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Finally, our work also relates to the one of Gerlagh et al. (2009). While they show
that the introduction of optimal emission reduction policies strongly depends on
the set of instruments available, we take the opposite perspective and study how
policies can lose their effects as time goes by. In that, we are close to Bretschger
and Schaefer (2017), where energy policies affect the interplay between the his-
tory of innovations and the expectations on future technologies in determining the
transition. While they just focus on taxes and subsidies, we contrast the latter with
regulation policies.
3. THE MODEL
The baseline structure of our model is akin to the one in Acemoglu et al. (2012).
There is a continuum of households (composed of workers, entrepreneurs, and
scientists) with utility function:
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t u(Ct, St), (1)
where ρ is the discount rate, C is final consumption good, and S ∈ [0, S¯] cap-
tures the quality of the environment. Naturally, the instantaneous utility function
is increasing in consumption and environmental quality.5
On the supply side, a homogeneous final good is produced under perfect
competition employing clean and dirty inputs Yc and Yd:
Yt =
(
Y
−1

ct + Y
−1

dt
) 
−1
, (2)
where  ∈ (0, +∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. Note
that the two inputs are complements when  < 1 and substitutes if  > 1.
Both Yc and Yd, which can be read as energy units from different technologies,
are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-specific machines according
to the production functions:
Yjt = L1−αjt
∫ 1
0
A1−αjit x
α
jitdi, (3)
with j ∈ {c, d} and α ∈ (0, 1); Ajit is the productivity of machine i in sector j and
xjit is the quantity of such machine. The aggregate productivity of the two sectors
is defined as
Ajt ≡
∫ 1
0
Ajitdi. (4)
Total labor supply is normalized to 1 and the market-clearing condition for labor
requires Lct + Ldt ≤ 1. Machines in both clean and dirty sectors are produced
by monopolistic competitive firms. The cost of producing a single machine is
constant across time and sectors and corresponds to ψ = α2.
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In both industries, an innovation occurs if a scientist successfully discovers a
new design. At the beginning of each period scientists try to develop a new clean
or dirty technology. If a scientist is successful, which happens with probability
ηj ∈ (0, 1), she obtains a 1-year patent for its machine i and becomes a mono-
polistic supplier.6 Innovations increase the productivity of a machine by a factor
1 + γ , with γ > 0. Normalizing the number of scientists to 1 the market-clearing
condition for scientists becomes sct + sdt ≤ 1, where sjt indicates the share of sci-
entists conducting research in sector j = {c, d} at time t. As scientists are randomly
allocated to machines in the sector they choose, the average productivity of sector
j evolves according to
Ajt = (1 + γ ηjsjt)Ajt−1. (5)
The variation of environmental quality St depends on environmental degra-
dation linked to the production of dirty inputs, as well as on environmental
regeneration due to the intrinsic dynamics of the Earth’s physical and biological
system:
St+1 = −ξYdt + (1 + δ)St, (6)
with St+1 bounded between 0 and S¯. The environmental degradation term catches
the negative effects of CO2 emissions,7 while the environmental regeneration term
captures the absorption of CO2 by the oceans and the biosphere [Oeschger et al.
(1975); Goudriaan and Ketner (1984), and Nordhaus (1992)]. Note that if St = 0,
an environmental disaster occurs.
4. CLIMATE POLICIES AND THE DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
In this section, we first recall the laissez-faire equilibrium (Section 4.1), where
no environmental policies are in place. We then study the impact of different
policy initiatives aimed at redirecting technical change toward the green sector
in order to reduce the total amount of dirty inputs used in the economy and, in
turn, avoid environmental disasters. More specifically, we compare the success
of M-B policies (cf. Section 4.2), composed of carbon taxes and subsidies to the
clean sector, with C&C interventions (cf. Section 4.3), which fix ceilings for the
production of dirty inputs.
4.1. The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Following Acemoglu et al. (2012), an equilibrium is represented by a sequence of
wages (wt), prices for inputs ( pjt) and machines ( pjit), demands for inputs (Yjt) and
machines (xjit), labor (Ljt), quality of environment (St), and research allocations
of scientists (sjt) such that: firms maximize their profits, scientists maximize their
expected profits, labor and input markets clear, and environmental quality evolves
according to equation (6). We recall that the laissez-faire equilibrium occurs when
no environmental policies are in place.
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Now, let us assume that the productivity of the green sector is sufficiently lower
than the one of the dirty industry:
ASSUMPTION 1. Ac0Ad0 < min
(
(1 + γ ηc)−
ϕ+1
ϕ
(
ηc
ηd
) 1
ϕ
, (1 + γ ηd)
ϕ+1
ϕ
(
ηc
ηd
) 1
ϕ
)
,
with ϕ ≡ (1 − α)(1 − ). Assumption 1 will hold throughout the rest of the paper.
If  > 1, innovation occurs only in the dirty sector and the long-run growth rate
of dirty inputs is γ ηd. If  < 1, innovation happens first in the clean sector, then it
will occur also in the fossil fuel one, and the long-run growth rate of dirty inputs
will be (ηdηc)/(ηd + ηc) < ηd. If Assumption 1 holds and  > 1, the laissez-faire
allocation will always produce an environmental disaster, that is, St = 0 for some t
[Acemoglu et al. (2012)].
Note that the direction of technical change is determined by the incentives sci-
entists face when they decide to conduct their research in the clean or dirty sector.
More specifically, the relative benefit from undertaking research in sector c rather
than in sector d is expressed by the ratio:
ct
dt
= ηc
ηd
(
pct
pdt
) 1
1−α Lct
Ldt
Act−1
Adt−1
. (7)
Equation (7) reveals that the relative profitability of research in the two sectors
can be decomposed in three components which capture productivity differentials
(Act−1/Adt−1), relative prices ((pct/pdt)
1
1−α ), and market size (Lct/Ldt). Finally, the
equilibrium demand of the two inputs is determined by
Yc =
(
Aϕc + Aϕd
)− α+ϕϕ Aα+ϕc Ad, (8)
Yd =
(
Aϕc + Aϕd
)− α+ϕϕ Aα+ϕd Ac, (9)
whose evolution over time depends on the sectoral allocation of scientists
[cf. equation (7)] and on the stochastic process characterizing the dynamics of
machines’ productivity.
4.2. M-B Environmental Policies
In the model, an M-B environmental policy is composed of a carbon tax and a
subsidy toward clean research proportional to firms’ profits. When the two inputs
Yc and Yd are substitutes ( > 1) and the economy is initially stuck in the bad
laissez-faire equilibrium, the social planner can redirect technical change toward
the green technology introducing a carbon tax td on the production of dirty inputs
and a public subsidy qc supporting the research in the clean sector.8 Both the
carbon tax and the R&D subsidy can be introduced at any time t = T , with the
obvious consequence that a delayed introduction might imply a stronger inter-
vention. Throughout the paper we assume that (i) after introduction, the strength
of the policy is constant (i.e., tax and subsidy levels do not vary over time)9 and
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(ii) subsidies have to be finite and the carbon tax, expressed as a percentage of the
price of dirty inputs, must be lower than one. In particular tdt < pdt and qct < +∞.
Notice that if such assumptions do not hold, the model collapses to a degenerate
case of a one-sector economy where the issue of directed technical change loose
its rationale. For the sake of consistency, a similar assumption will be introduced
for the case of C&C policies.
REMARK 1. We stress that M-B policies considered in this section directly
affect the expected profitability of conducting research in either of the two sectors.
In particular, tdt reduces the proceedings from sales of dirty inputs that scientists
conducting research in the dirty sector might expect. Solving the profit maximiza-
tion problem for firms in the dirty sector at the time of policy intervention t = T
yields
dT = ηd(1 + γ )(1 − α)
(
pdT − tdT
) 1
1−α LdTAdT−1. (10)
It follows that increasing tdT implies—ceteris paribus—lower expected profitabil-
ity from the dirty sector and that tdT = pdT would make such sector completely
unprofitable.
However, the direction of technical change is not only dependent on policy
variables (tdt and qct). In fact, the past history of innovations, which in turns deter-
mines the relative productivity of the clean and dirty sectors and the profitability
of performing research therein, plays a fundamental role. As a consequence, given
the importance of path dependence [Aghion et al. (2016)], even if carbon taxes
and subsidies might affect the direction of technical change, they have a bounded
time interval to push the economy away from a bad, carbon-intensive equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume  > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. Assume that a
government is considering the implementation of an M-B policy scheme, (qct, tdt),
composed of a finite subsidy qct for the clean sector and a carbon tax tdt on
the production of dirty inputs lower than their unitary price, tdt < pdt, both to
be introduced at time t = T. Then, there exists a finite A¯d > 0 s.t. ∀Adt > A¯d
(i) (qcT , tdT ) is ineffective in re-directing technical change toward the clean
sector,
(ii) the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists is sdt = 1 and sct = 0 for any
t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. in Supplementary Material. 
Proposition 1 shows that given M-B environmental policies fail whenever the
productivity differentials between the dirty and clean sectors are sufficiently large.
The intuition behind such a result is that once the relative productivity advantage
of dirty technology is large enough, it will always compensate the cost of the
carbon tax and the benefit of the subsidy. This happens because the policy scheme
affects the relative profitability of clean technologies only via the market size
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effect. Accordingly, potential entrepreneurs will maximize expected profits by
investing in the carbon-intensive sector, thereby undermining the effectiveness of
the carbon tax.
REMARK 2. Formally, the M-B policy shifts the economy toward a good
equilibrium (sct = 1 and sdt = 0) whenever the following condition is satisfied:
(1 + qcT )ηc
ηd
(
pdT − tdT
pdT
)−
(1 + γ ηd)ϕ+1
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)−ϕ
> 1,
where T is the time step the policy is introduced in (details in Appendix A.1.
in Supplementary Material). Crucially, such condition depends on AdT−1, which
embodies the past history of innovations, that is, the dynamics of Adt for
t = 1, . . . , T − 1. Further, Assumption 1 implies that Adt increases (on average)
over time, while Act remains constant. We will see in the next section that,
conversely, a C&C policy is immune from such a path-dependent effect.
The next proposition states that process of technical change will push, sooner
or later, the productivity of dirty machine beyond any threshold A¯d with certainty.
PROPOSITION 2. Assume that  > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. Then, it
exits a time step t = T∗ such that AdT∗ > A¯d for any A¯d ≥ Ad0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. in Supplementary Material. 
The main consequence of Proposition 2 is that the timing of the introduction of
M-B environmental policies is crucial. If the economy is stuck in the bad equilib-
rium (sd = 1), then there exists a bounded window opportunity for policy scheme
(qct, tdt) to be effective. More precisely, the window opportunity for an M-B policy
introduced at time T lasts
[
log
(
Ad
AdT
)]
/[log(1 + ηdγ )] periods.
REMARK 3. Given the evolution of the quality of the environment [equa-
tion (6)], a too much delayed policy intervention inevitably leads to an environ-
mental disaster. Indeed, as the economy is stuck in a bad equilibrium (sd = 1), Ydt
increases at a rate of γ ηd, static M-B policies become ineffective, and St reaches
zero in finite time, thereby producing a disaster.
REMARK 4. The higher the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs
(), the shorter the time window in which M-B policies are effective.
The intuition underlying the last remark is straightforward. If the elasticity of
substitution of clean and dirty inputs increases, producers will have higher incen-
tives to switch toward the cheaper dirty ones, creating additional demand for these
inputs. Accordingly, the relative profitability of dirty inputs increases, reducing
the threshold Ad above which policy interventions are ineffective.
Carbon taxes are a meaningful tool for emission control policy. At the same
time, Propositions 1 and 2 show that, when markets are competitive and dirty
and clean inputs are substitutes, their effectiveness cannot be guaranteed a priori.
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TABLE 1. Minimum carbon taxes to redirect technical change and corresponding
window of opportunities (in parenthesis) under different policy schemes
Subsidy (proportion of clean sector’ profits)
20% 10% 5%
Backwardness of Expected
clean technologies productivity growth
Low (70% of dirty) 19.0% (118) 20.4% (117) 20.0% (117)
Medium (50% of dirty) Low 33.8% (106) 34.4% (105) 34.7% (105)
High (20% of dirty) 61.8% (76) 62.1% (75) 62.3% (75)
Low (70% of dirty) 21.6% (36) 22.3% (36) 22.6% (36)
Medium (50% of dirty) High 35.9% (33) 36.5% (32) 36.8% (32)
High (20% of dirty) 63.0% (23) 63.3% (22) 63.5% (22)
Low (70% of dirty) 30.5% (33) 31.1% (33) 31.4% (33)
Medium (50% of dirty) Asymmetric 43.2% (30) 43.7% (30) 43.9% (30)
High (20% of dirty) 67.2% (20) 67.5% (20) 67.6% (20)
Notes: Low, medium, and high expected productivity growth correspond to an average growth rate of machines’
productivity of 1%, 3%, and 8%, respectively. With asymmetric expected productivity growth, they correspond to
8% for dirty technologies and 3% for clean ones. The minimum carbon tax is computed until it reaches 99%.
The productivity gap between carbon-intensive and green technologies becomes
crucial for the success of M-B environmental policies. In addition, such a gap
widens over time due to the sub-martingale nature of machines’ productivity
(cf. proof of Proposition 2), implying that—for given policy schemes (qc, td)—
delayed interventions are likely to be ineffective. However, when the government
is allowed to fix the tax rate as close to 100% as it wants, a sufficiently high tax
can redirect technical change as well.
Table 1 collects results from numerical experiments that support these claims. It
considers different scenarios defined by the expected productivity growth, initial
relative backwardness of clean technologies, and the size of the subsidy. In many
cases, the window of opportunity for M-B policy lasts very few periods, and the
carbon tax needed to redirect technical change is extremely high. For example,
when the productivity of clean technologies is initially half of the dirty ones and
the expected productivity growth is high, the carbon tax required to move the
economy toward the “green” equilibrium is above 35% and it has to be introduced
within 30 periods. With even stronger backwardness of clean technologies, the
minimum tax would correspond to 61% of dirty sector’s revenues and the window
of opportunity reduces to about 20 periods.
A further insight on the potential shortness of M-B’s effectiveness period is
provided by Figure 1. Numerical simulations of the model under different tech-
nological regimes (corresponding to the technological opportunities in the two
sectors) allow illustrating the dynamics of productivities that, in turn, determine
the magnitude of the minimum carbon tax necessary to put the economy on a
“green” development path. Simulation results show that, in many circumstances,
the minimum tax rate rapidly approaches the unit, becoming ineffective as a
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Notes: Figures on the left column (a),(c),(e) show the Monte Carlo average dynamics of productivities
(left vertical axis) and minimum carbon tax (left vertical axis) to redirect technical change obtained
across 100 independent runs; figures on the right column (b),(d),(f) show the relationship between
average carbon taxes and the ratio between clean and dirty sector productivity, each point represents
a period. The minimum tax rate is reported until it reaches 99%. Each row of figures is characterized
by different technological regimes: low (a),(b) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 1%,
medium (c),(d) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 3%, high (e),(f) corresponds to an
average productivity growth of 8%. All simulations are obtained setting  = 10, α = 1/3, and initial
the initial productivity ratio Ac0/Ad0 = 0.8.
FIGURE 1. Window opportunities, minimum carbon tax, and productivities under different
technological regimes. (a) ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1. (b) ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1. (c) ηd = 0.3, γ = 0.1.
(d) ηd = 0.3, γ = 0.1. (e) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2. (f) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2.
policy instrument. Such evidences are partially confirmed when a gradual car-
bon tax is considered, which is a quite diffused practice in the literature [see,
e.g., Stern (2007)].10 Numerical simulations summarized in Figure 2 show that
when technological change is relatively slow and the productivity ratio of clean
to dirty technologies declines gradually, a sharply increasing carbon tax might be
sufficient to redirect technical change [see panel (b)]. However, under either too
gradual carbon taxation [panel (a)] or sustained technological change [panels (c)
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Notes: Figures show the Monte Carlo average dynamics of productivity ratio (left vertical axis), grad-
ually increasing carbon tax, and minimum additional policy strength (delta tax; right vertical axis)
to redirect technical change obtained across 100 independent runs. The additional tax is reported
until the overall tax rate reaches 99%. Each row of figures is characterized by different technological
regimes: low (a),(b) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 1%, high (e),(f) corresponds to
an average productivity growth of 8%. All simulations are obtained setting  = 10, α = 1/3, and the
initial productivity ratio Ac0/Ad0 = 0.8. Moderately increasing carbon tax grows at a rate of 0.8% per
period; rapidly increasing carbon tax grows at a rate of 1.8% per period. The initial level of the carbon
tax is 5%.
FIGURE 2. Window opportunities, minimum carbon tax, and productivities under different
technological regimes. (a) ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and moderately increasing carbon tax. (b)
ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and rapidly increasing carbon tax. (c) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2 and moderately
increasing carbon tax. (d) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2 and rapidly increasing carbon tax.
and (d)], the behavior of the windows of opportunity (indicated by the red dashed
vertical line) is almost identical to the case of abrupt, one-shot policy intervention
(Figure 1).
Given such dismal results, are there alternative policy interventions that redirect
technical change toward the green sector, thus preventing climate catastrophes,
without suffering from path dependence? In the next section, we will show that
such objectives can be achieved by appropriate C&C policies.
4.3. C&C Policies
A C&C policy refers to an environmental intervention that relies on regula-
tion (permission, prohibition, standard setting, and enforcement) as opposed
to monetary incentives, i.e., economic instruments of cost internalization [UN
(1997)]. In particular, we consider a policy that establishes the maximum amount
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κ of dirty inputs that can be used for each unit of clean ones. Further, we assume
that, after its introduction, such a policy does vary over time11:
Yct
Ydt
≥ κ , ∀t > T , (11)
where κ ∈ (0; +∞) represents the C&C policy chosen by the government and
introduced at any time t = T . We underline that our assumption requiring κ to be
finite and strictly positive is, in comparative terms, equivalent to the requirement
we made on td in Section 4.2; both assumptions are introduced to prevent the triv-
ial case where the market for dirty inputs is not profitable and, thus, economically
viable. Given Assumption 1, as in the laissez-faire equilibrium, innovations start
in the more productive dirty sector. Moreover, if  > 1 and given equations (8)
and (9), C&C policies [cf. equation (11)] will be binding in equilibrium. In the
laissez-fair case, dirty (Ydt) and clean (Yct) inputs are employed competitively by
final good producers, which maximize their profits according to:
max
Yct ,Ydt
{ptYt − pctYct − pdtYdt} s.t. Yt =
(
Y
−1

ct + Y
−1

dt
) 
−1
. (12)
Assuming that the C&C policy is introduced as a constraint on final good
producers, first-order conditions imply
Yct
Ydt

=
(
pct
pdt
)−
, (13)
due to the presence of the policy. However, as in the laissez-faire equilib-
rium, relative prices are determined by relative productivity of dirty and clean
technologies:
pct
pdt
=
(
Act
Adt
)− 11−α
. (14)
Furthermore, as dirty inputs are relatively cheaper, equation (11) binds and it is
possible to express the relative employment in the clean sector as
Lct
Ldt
= Yct
Ydt
(
pct
pdt
)− α1−α (Act
Adt
)−1
= κ
(
Act
Adt
)−(1−α)
. (15)
Equation (15) shows that whenever the relative demand of dirty inputs is con-
strained by the C&C policy, any productivity gain in the carbon intensive sector
is labor destroying. Indeed, since firms cannot expand production, any increases
in machine productivity will increase profits by reducing the number of employ-
ees needed for production. The profitability ratio of conducting research in the
two sectors then becomes
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ct
dt
= ηc
ηd
(
pct
pdt
) 1
1−α Lct
Ldt
Act−1
Adt−1
(16)
= ηc
ηd
κ
(
Act
Adt
)−(1−α) Act−1
Adt−1
= ηc
ηd
κ
(
1 + ηcsct
1 + ηdsdt
)−(2−α) (Act−1
Adt−1
)−(1−α)
,
where the second equality follows combining equations (7), (13) and (15), and
the third one is obtained via equation (5). It follows that under a C&C policy the
equilibrium expected profitability of the two sectors depends upon the productiv-
ity of currently available machines, but with an opposite effect of the policy with
respect to the laissez-faire and M-B cases. In particular, the relative profitability of
the green sector increases with the productivity of dirty technologies thanks to the
market size effect incorporated in equation (15). We can now state the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. Consider a C&C policy κ . If  > 1, then there exists a finite
κ¯ > 0 such that any κ ≥ κ¯ always redirects technical change toward the green
sector.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. in Supplementary Material. 
The main intuition behind Proposition 3 is that any C&C policy sufficiently
limiting the relative share of dirty inputs creates an additional demand for clean
ones, thus increasing the profitability of the green sector. Further, in presence
of C&C policies, and in contrast to M-B interventions, innovations in the dirty
sector are increasingly labor destroying and reduce the relative profitability of
the industry. As a consequence, the minimum C&C policy needed to redirect
technical change shrinks over time, as indicated by equation (16). The foregoing
results are also robust to the case where the C&C constraint hits producers of dirty
inputs rather than final good ones.12
If a suitable policy is implemented, technical change moves toward a develop-
ment path where innovations occur only in the clean sector. Moreover, once the
new equilibrium is achieved, the economy behaves as in the “good” laissez faire
scenario, where output Yt and use of clean inputs Yct grow at the long-run rate γ ηc
[see equations (8), (9), and (4) and recall that Act grows at a rate of γ ηc while Adt
remains constant].
REMARK 5. A temporary C&C policy intervention κ is sufficient to redirect
technical change permanently.
Sooner or later, any strength of the C&C policy becomes effective. When the
economy moves toward a “good” equilibrium, Yct grows faster than Yd, as the
clean sector is more profitable than the dirty one, thus increasing the ratio Yct/Ydt.
The C&C policy sustains the improvement of machines’ productivity in the
clean sector, thereby increasing the ratio Act/Adt. When such ratio becomes suffi-
ciently high, the C&C policy is not needed anymore as research is spontaneously
performed only in the clean sector.
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Given the results in Acemoglu et al. (2012) and using equations (8) and (9), one
can conclude that when all scientists are allocated to the clean sector (sct = 1), the
production of dirty inputs (Ydt) grows at a rate (1 + γ ηc)α+γ − 1 > 0 if the two
inputs are weak substitutes [i.e., 1 <  < 1/(1 − α)]. In contrast, when inputs are
strong substitutes [ > 1/(1 − α)], Ydt behaves in the long run as Aα+ϕct , which in
turns decreases over time.
These considerations, coupled with findings of Section 4.2, lead to the central
results of the paper, which are collected in the following theorem.
THEOREM. Assume that a government is planning the introduction of an envi-
ronmental policy aimed at inducing a green transition. If  > 1, path dependence
in technological change
1. favors the effectiveness of a C&C policy κ ,
2. hinders the effectiveness of a M-B policy (qc, td).
The history of innovations makes it dynamically easier to induce an equilibrium
where all scientist conduct research on clean technologies via a C&C policy fix-
ing the maximum usable amount of dirty inputs for each unit of clean ones; to the
contrary, an M-B intervention (made up of combinations of taxes and subsidies)
must be increasingly stronger as technological change gradually takes place. As
a consequence, any given M-B policy can be ineffective in promoting the transi-
tion if sufficiently delayed, while the likelihood of success of a C&C intervention
increases with the speed of technological change. Obviously, when the govern-
ment is allowed to fix the tax rate as close to 100% as it wants, a sufficiently high
tax can redirect technical change as well.
The above results imply that appropriate climate policies are able to prevent
environmental catastrophes under the assumption that dirty and clean inputs
are strong substitutes. More precisely, C&C policies are always successful in
avoiding St to reach zero, whereas M-B solutions are effective only if they are
implemented at the right time. If inputs are weak substitutes instead, final good
production requires increasing amount of dirty inputs which cannot be replaced
by clean ones, even though the productivity of dirty machines keeps constant. As
a result, an environmental disaster looks inevitable.
Given such a gloomy perspective, is there an environmental policy that works
even if clean and dirty inputs are weak substitutes? The next proposition provides
a positive answer.
PROPOSITION 4. Let κˆ be a C&C policy imposing a fixed ceiling on the use
of dirty inputs Ydt such that Ydt ≤ κˆ and assume  > 1. Then, there exists a finite
κˆ ′ > 0 such that ∀ κˆ ∈ (0, κˆ ′) the policy always redirects technical change toward
the green sector and prevents an environmental disaster.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. in Supplementary Material. 
The claim follows straightforwardly from Proposition 3 and equation (6).13
A fixed-ceiling C&C policy is always effective, even when inputs weak
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TABLE 2. Policy intervention and guaranteed results
Redirection of technical change Prevention of environmental disaster
Weak substitutes Strong substitutes Weak substitutes Strong substitutes
M-B
Taxes Window only Window only No Window only
Subsidies Window only Window only No Window only
Taxes and
subsidies
Window only Window only No Window only
Optimal
policy
Window only Window only No Window only
C&C
Relative
share
Yes Yes No Yes
Absolute
limit
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: By optimal policy we mean the combination of taxes and subsidies derived in Acemoglu et al. (2012).
substitutes, whereas in Acemoglu et al. (2012) disasters can be avoided only by
switching off economic growth.
The results obtained from our policy exercises are summarized in Table 2. Only
a C&C policy fixing the maximal amount of dirty inputs in the economy is always
able to guarantee both technical change redirection and avoidance of environ-
mental disasters. Marked-based solutions are effective only within their limited
window of opportunity but, in general, they fail to guarantee disasters’ prevention.
The lack of symmetry between the effects produced by the two types of
policy instruments is attributable to the role of path dependence in technical
change. In the laissez-faire and M-B cases, innovation has a self-perpetuating
nature grounded on its own past success. This makes the transition to a clean
equilibrium more and more difficult over time. On the contrary, in the C&C
scenario, the labor-destroying effect of innovation [see equation (15)] either
compensates (when the constraint is imposed on input producers) or overcomes
(in case the constraint is imposed on final good producers) the direct productivity
effect.14 An interesting future development of the current framework will be the
introduction of aggregate uncertainties on disasters and technological progress
á la Weitzman (1974) to study the joint effects of path-dependent innovation
processes and the presence of uncertainty in a growth model characterized by
directed technical change.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have compared the impact of environmental M-B policies with
C&C ones in a model with endogenous growth and directed technical change.
M-B policies are grounded on a carbon tax and a subsidy to the green sector,
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whereas C&C interventions fix limits to the production of dirty inputs and related
greenhouse gas emissions.
We find that M-B policies are not always successful to redirect technical change
from the dirty to the green sector. Given the cumulativeness of technical change
[Aghion et al. (2016)], time is fundamental and a green transition can be trig-
gered only in a limited window of opportunity. In particular, if the productivity
gap between the dirty and green sectors becomes too high, M-B policies become
ineffective. The time for an effective intervention gets shorter if the two inputs are
“weak” substitutes. In the latter case, M-B policies are never able to prevent envi-
ronmental catastrophes. On the contrary, if the dirty and green inputs are “strong”
substitutes, timely M-B interventions can successfully avoid the occurrence of
disasters.
C&C policies are more effective than M-B interventions. This result arises
because M-B policies work only via a market size channel (larger input sector
stimulates innovation), whereas C&C interventions also affect relative prices and
are favored (or unaffected) by the productivity gap between dirty and green tech-
nologies [cf. equation (7)]. This explains why the evolution of the technologies
contributes to the success of C&C policies, which are also always effective in
preventing environmental disasters when inputs are strong substitutes. If the dirty
and green inputs are weak substitutes, the only environmental policy that guaran-
tees avoiding a climate catastrophe is a C&C intervention fixing an absolute limit
on the use of polluting inputs.
Despite its simplicity, our work delivers clear-cut insights on the effectiveness
and flexibility of policy intervention. In particular, our findings support the cur-
rent behavior of governments, which are timid in introducing carbon pricing, and
rely instead on regulations that redirect investment toward clean capital, such as
stricter energy efficiency standards on new capital and buildings [IEA (2016)].
Beyond sustaining the transition toward clean technologies, such regulatory mea-
sures are effective in preventing the occurrence of environmental disasters by
directly imposing physical limits on polluting substances. In addition, recent
empirical evidence shows that environmental regulation has a pivotal role from
an international perspective, as it helps prevent “pollution havens” [Jobert et al.
(2018)]. For these reasons, we also believe quantity-based environmental pol-
icy should receive much larger attention in the economic literature that, to the
contrary, tends focusing on the analysis of price-based mechanisms. As a future
work, the model could be extended to account for the political-economy pro-
cesses involved in the design of climate-change policies and to incorporate an
international dimension and aggregate uncertainty in the process of technical
change.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1365100518001001.
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NOTES
1. This paper is not the only contribution recently investigating the effectiveness of environ-
mental policy in relation to economic factors beyond uncertainty [Weitzman (1974)]; for exam-
ple, Constant and Davin (2018) evaluate the relationship between policy, education, and growth
when green preferences are endogenous; while Palivos and Varvarigos (2017) focus on abate-
ment policy and growth when environmental degradation comes with health-depressing effects. The
present paper concentrates on the role of path-dependent technological change in shaping policy
effectiveness.
2. Lamperti et al. (2018) use an agent-based integrated assessment model to show that, in general,
M-B policies need to be remarkably strong to have an appreciable effect on the chances of a transition
and, further, that climate shocks interact with the policy itself.
3. The works of Smulders and De Nooij (2003) and Popp (2004) are examples of earlier studies
on directed technical change and environmental issues.
4. For an excellent review on technological change and the environment see also Popp et al.
(2010).
5. The utility function is twice differentiable and jointly concave in C and S. Standard Inada-type
conditions hold for C and S approaching zero and infinity. Therefore, households’ utility consid-
erably falls when environmental quality approaches zero. Further, if S = S¯, additional increases of
environmental quality do not lead to utility improvements.
6. In sectors where the innovation process is unsuccessful, a 1-year patent is randomly assigned
to one of the producers using the old technology.
7. One could reasonably define CO2 emissions as directly proportional to the use of dirty inputs:
Emt ∝ Ydt.
8. As in Acemoglu et al. (2012) we assume that the social planner has access to lump-sum taxes
and transfers to complement and/or finance such policy measures.
9. We present a numerical exercise to show how the model behaves when removing such assump-
tion. Results are robust. It is sufficient to consider the static (constant) policy equal to the maximum
level of the dynamic one to obtain the same results as those described in the text.
10. The graduality of the carbon tax often stems from the combination of concave utility and convex
damage functions.
11. The effects of such policy on the direction of technical change are equivalent to the ones of an
absolute upper bound for the use of dirty inputs. We refer to the relative threshold per unit of clean
inputs to simplify computations.
12. In such scenario, relative prices are determined by the relative demands of inputs, which
resemble those of the laissez-faire equilibrium. Under a binding constraint, one gets ct/dt =
(ηc/ηd)κ −1 [(1 + ηcsct)(1 + ηdsdt)]−1, that is, the relative profitability does not depend on the past his-
tory of innovations. Hence, a sufficiently high (but finite) κ is enough to redirect technical change
avoiding path dependence. Formally, the C&C policy shifts the economy toward a good equilib-
rium (sct = 1 and sdt = 0) whenever the following condition is satisfied: (ηc/ηd)κ
−1

T (1 + ηcγ )−1 > 1,
where T is the time step the policy is introduced. Such condition does not depend on past relative
productivities.
13. The maximum Ydt allowed by the regulation policy at time t must be below St−1/ξ in order to
prevent the realization of an environmental disaster.
14. Also the use of a carbon tax equal to the price of dirty inputs would completely remove expected
profits in that sector, triggering a complete shift toward the clean technology. However, we rule out
such a trivial scenario, where the tax would completely erode the profitability of the dirty sector
thereby leaving alive just the green one, by assumption. Further, we claim that such a choice can be
justified through political economy arguments [see also Goulder and Parry (2008), on the generally
low political workability of carbon taxes].
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